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Introduction
Traditionally, the military was one of the major financial commitments of the state. Such relative priority has diminished with the passage of time. And while the Cold War that occupied so much of the last half of the 20 th century drew large amounts of monies into military budgets as states responded to perceived external threats, its passage has generally brought about a widespread retreat. In many Western countries, fewer and fewer resources are devoted to the national defense function. The 20 th century and particularly its latter half also increasingly came to be marked by an extensive rise in the relative prices of military capital.
With declining levels of financial commitment and rising costs in weapons systems, the military forces in many of the Western countries have become increasingly hollow.
The Evolution of Military Expenditure
Unlike many other functions of government, the availability of data on military spending generally can be characterized as being unproblematic. This is not to say that there are no difficulties nor disputes; rather, it is to say that at least in terms of the Western nations there is fairly widespread acceptance of at least one source, namely the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's publication (SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security) . SIPRI has made publicly available a fairly comprehensive database for the post-World War II era. The SIPRI volume has been published annually since 1970 and provides comparable and continuous annual military expenditure series (in local currency, US constant price dollars, and as a share of GDP) for most countries, going back as far as 1950. Serious problems and disputes were common during the Cold War with regard to the military outlays of the centrally planned economies (see Cusack and Ward, 1981) and the issue of military spending levels in the People's Republic of China remains contentious.
Included within SIPRI's measure of military spending are four major categories of current and capital outlays for: (1) the armed forces along with peacekeeping forces; (2) the defense bureaucracy (and other agencies engaged in military activities); (3) paramilitary forces; and (4) military space activities.
SIPRI's definition is based on the NATO approach. It does exclude three things that some would argue should be included; these are outlays on civil defense, payment to military veterans, and servicing of war debt. All in all, SIPRI probably is still the most respected source on military spending for purposes of crossnational comparisons. per cent of its net national expenditure and America's stood at 42 per cent of its GNP (figures from Harrison, 1998, 21) .
The Cold War was witness to inordinately high defense burdens. These relative shares, however, steadily declined over time and with the passage of the East-West conflict the average burden reached levels not seen since the interWorld War period or the end of the 19 th Century.
The 20 th Century will not be remembered as a peaceful one. Still, as
Ferguson points out:
" [A] fter many centuries during which the cost of warfare was the biggest influence on state budgets, that role was usurped in the second half of the 20 th century by the cost of welfare" (Ferguson, 2001, p.27) .
So, despite the massive violence and mayhem, the century also brought about a marked change in the relative priorities of Western governments in terms of resource allocation. In 1900, military budgets accounted for about a quarter of all government spending (see Table 1 ). By 2000, this share stood at about four per cent. Military spending was more than six times the amount spent on social transfers in 1900. This disparity was radically reversed by the end of the end of the 20 th Century, with social transfers amounting to nearly ten times the amount spent on the military. Cusack and Fuchs (2003) and Lindert (2004) .
The century-long revision of priorities has been dramatic. Even more impressive is to compare these figures with those of one example from the period 1700 to 1799. This is the British case. Across the entire 18 th Century, spending for the army, navy and ordnance combined alone constituted more than half, i.e., 52 per cent, of total public spending. 3 Debt management outlays came to an extremely high 37 per cent and the entire civilian function was funded by the derisible residual of 12 per cent of total state outlays. When one looks at the military budget and compares it with the total public outlays net of debt charges (nearly all of which were incurred to support the military effort in the many years of war involvement during the period), on average it came to 80 per cent of all spending. Why so great a burden? According to Levy (1983) , in 52 years of the 18 th Century, Britain was engaged in war against one or more major power.
During some of these years, it was involved in two separate major power wars.
This count excludes from consideration war involvements against non-major powers or non-state actors. So, whereas the state was once little more than a war-fighting machine with attendant apparatus to garner and administer the 5 revenues to conduct these wars, the military function for most of the Western states has receded to the unspectacular role of being barely more than a minor financial footnote at the beginning of the 21 st Century.
I focus now briefly on the evolution of military spending in the last half of the 20 th Century through to the first few years of the 21 st . In Figure 1 Particularly up to the beginning of the 1990s, the three series provide some visual affirmation of the standard explanation of the dynamics of East-West military budgets: a competitive accumulation of arms sustained by rising financial outlays. In addition, the US series is marked by a set of cycles, the first two of which are connected to the mobilization and demobilization processes associated with major wars (Korean and Vietnamese). The third American cycle is connected initially with the Reagan buildup (here there is something to be said for the primacy of domestic considerations behind this rise) and the decline connected to the tapering off of the Cold War. On the far right side of the graph one sees the dramatic decline in Soviet/Russian outlays with demise of the former and collapse of the latter's economy. American outlays declined and stabilized through the 1990s and then took off with the onset of the Bush II administration and its "war on terrorism." While the large residual group of other OECD countries as a whole closely paralleled the Soviet trajectory, these outlays 6 tended to decline after the Cold War. This was followed by a long period of stability.
Figure 1
Altering the measure of military effort to one that reflects the burden on the economy (Figure 2 ), one sees that the average burden to the economy within the 20 OECD economies followed a general downward trend. So, even if in real terms, per above, the dollar value of military outlays generally rose throughout the last half of the 20 th century, the relative burden tended to decline over time, going from over seven percent of GDP in the mid-1950s to close to two percent by the end of the century.
It is notable that even with the post-Cold War decline in the defense burden there was no pick-up in share of national economic resources coming from this group of wealthy countries to the Third World in the form of foreign aid (official development assistance, ODA). Although the UN ODA target, adopted in the early 1970s, is 0.7 percent of GNP, few potential donor countries have ever met the goal. Even the liberation of national economic resources from defense needs brought about by the end of the Cold War was a major disappointment for the group as a whole. This opportunity to employ some of the freed-up resources for this other important international function was taken by only five of the twenty countries. Indeed, nearly all of the rest both cut the amount of relative resources going to defense and to foreign aid. This formulation, whether the US is included in the sample or not, appears to work very well (see Table 3 ). Western nations seem to have responded to variation in Soviet/Russian military outlays in the action/reaction style associated with the classic arms race formulation (see Cusack, 1985b) . Income played the expected role with higher real GDP leading to greater military outlays. 4 The model estimated takes the following form: (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) . Columns I through III of Table 4 present results on the cross-sectional estimates of the determinants of the levels of defense burdens across three different periods, the 1980s, the 1990s, and the first few years of the new century. The results provide little support for the contention that the restraining effects of the economic variables frequently alluded to in accounting for lower levels of other public spending were also at work in shaping the relative size of the military budget. In only one decade is one of the estimated effects statistically significant, this is the coefficient on the trade openness measure, and it takes on a negative sign. When the convergence effect is also included in a formulation meant to account for the change from the 1980s to the new century (column IV), it turns out to be the only statistically significant factor in shaping these dynamics.
None of the putative restraining or dampening effects is detectable. Finally, in column V it is clear that the arms race effect is the dominant influence on the 5 The cross-sectional equation estimated is:
defense burden. The convergence effect is also at work. And, it would appear that the change in the level of affluence, captured by the inter-period first difference in income per capita, acts to lower the overall level of the military burden. Income per capita is period average for estimates in I-III and V; in IV it is growth rate over whole period.
Trade openness is period average in I-III and V; in IV it is period average of first decade . Debt Burden is period average in I-III and V; in IV it is period average in first decade . Lagged Defense Burden is average defense burden in period immediately previous. Soviet/Russian Military Spending is in natural logs for each period.
Cols I-IV: t-statistics in parentheses; Col. 5:z-statistics. *--statistically significant at .05 level.
In sum, although the internationalization of the economy as well as the levels of accumulated public debt appear to be important forces in acting as dampening factors in other non-welfare spending functions, their impact hardly registers on the budgetary military burdens countries bear. Instead, it would seem that the rise and decline of a major international military threat to these countries has been a central influence.
Labour, Capital, and the Hollowing of the Military
Military Personnel
In the West, to a great extent, the rise and decline in military spending is reflected in the trend in the personnel employed within the military (see Figure 4) . 
Military Capital
It has been possible to collect a significant amount of data on major military capital items for a large number of countries, both East and West. These data have been collected and coded from the International Institute for Strategic Studies' annual publication, The Military Balance. The data collection effort has been described in greater detail elsewhere (Cusack, 1985a The three data series consider only important military equipment that can be used for conventional combat and exclude items entirely devoted to strategic nuclear purposes. It should be noted that some analysts (see, e.g., Lieber and In terms of land-based military capital items, one can observe a dramatic gap to the apparent advantage of its Eastern competitors (see Figure 6 ).
Throughout the Cold War period, the East enjoyed more than a two-to-one advantage. However, it should be pointed out that inside the Socialist centrally planned economies, counts of the number of capital items, particularly main battle tanks, almost certainly exaggerate of the actual number of functioning weapons platforms. Within centrally planned economic systems, there was little or no incentive to produce spare parts. Often, then, a significant portion of existing weapons stocks was cannibalized in order to replace worn-out parts.
Nevertheless, on both sides of the East-West conflict, there was a substantial rise in the stock of such weapons through the 1970s and 1980s. And, again, with the end of the Cold War, there were dramatic cutbacks on both sides.
Finally, along the third dimension, the air, one can see that the decline in the Western stock of fixed-wing combat aircraft with the winding down of the Vietnam War was eventually followed by a build up during the Reagan administrations (see Figure 7) . With the end of the Cold War, the stock of such weapons systems once again set into decline. Over the entire period, there was an almost consistent downward trend in the stock of these weapons held by the Warsaw Pact countries. Russian stocks plummeted through the 1990s and into the first few years of the new century. On a country-by-country basis, the picture is generally uniform. Table 6 provides information on the country holdings of the three major conventional military capital items for the years 1970, 1980, 1989, and 2004 . For most counties, the stocks of these weapons have generally declined, and in quite a number of cases significantly. For example, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and even the United States have greatly cut back on the air, land and naval forces' major weapons stocks, and this despite the significant efforts to maintain or actually increase their stocks during the last decade of the Cold War.
For many of the smaller countries the scope of these cutbacks has sometimes been as large if not greater. 
The Dramatic Rise in Prices
In an era of declining capacity or willingness to finance the military, and in particular, to pay the costs of new capital acquisition in many countries, the seemingly ineluctable rise in the relative costs of military capital items has and will continue to hollow out the military might of these nations. Some analysts have remarked upon this feature (see Kirkpatrick and Pugh, 1983; Pugh, 1993; Kirkpatrick, 1995; Augustine, 1997) . Note that Kirkpatrick and Pugh (1983) Pugh (1993) for both UK and US weapons procurement.
Indeed, Augustine (1997, p.107) suggested that the tendency for the relative costs of military capital items to rise has achieved a law-like quality. This is summarized facetiously in the quote below:
"In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy 3-1/2 days each per week except for leap year, when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra day." Such a growth rate entails a doubling of construction costs over and above economy wide inflation every 12 years. While this pace of growth is not as great as that seen in the costs of fixed-wing combat aircraft (see below), it is still extremely high and poses grave challenges to governments attempting to keep costs under control while at the same time not diminishing the means employed in the pursuit of state aims. It is fascinating to realize that the problem of Baumol's (1967) disease, first characterized in the 1960s in reference to services as a whole and later often used to explain the growing costs of government because of its heavy reliance on labour in the delivery of services (e.g., Beck, 1981) , is actually reversed in the case of the military.
Of course, acquisition is not the only cost confronted in fielding a major weapons system. There are additional costs that cannot be avoided. Given the long service life that governments attempt to achieve for these expensive weapons systems, one also needs to take into account the modernization costs that are periodically required over a long life-span as well as the operating and support costs incurred if these systems are to be employed for the purposes for which they were constructed. Finally the deactivation and disposal costs also 
Figure 8
Nearly as dramatic has been the rise in real terms of the unit costs of fighter aircraft, of which there has been a far broader and diverse set of acquisitions (see Figure 9 ). The first type that I have been able to assemble data on both initial year of service and purchase cost is the JN-4, the first mass- Based on these data, the estimated average annual rates of growth in real unit costs of US bombers and fighter planes were 13.3 and 9.9 per cent, respectively. These estimates are based on the historical data dealing with the unit prices and dates of deployment for 21 individual bombers and 43 fighter aircraft. Note, again, these inflation rates are over and above those occurring within the economy as a whole. Thus, if the GDP rose by an average annual rate of 1.7 per cent, a modest rate of overall inflation, the implied inflation rate in the cost of a bomber aircraft would be 15 per cent, , in other words, a doubling time of less than five years and a quadrupling in unit cost within less than a decade.
Figure 9
Extrapolating, using these rates and the prices of the last acquisitions in So, just as in the logic of Baumol's disease, the cost of one of two major items in the production function is growing disproportionately (and at a relatively rapid rate). One effect of this is to squeeze the capacity of the governments to maintain existing force levels. In this regard, the end of the Cold War came at an opportune and fortuitous moment. Demands for newer and even more expensive weapons systems subsided just as already stretched resources were being dramatically reduced.
One of the implications of the rapid relative rise in the unit cost of weapons systems is the decreasing frequency with which new systems are introduced into the military inventory (Lorell, 2003) . A very good example of this is to be found in the case of fixed-wing combat aircraft within the US military over the last century or so. Some of the long-run consequences only exaggerate the problem. One begins to see a decline in the frequency with which new systems can be
Office Personnel data come from the Correlates of War Project. Price data are from Johnston and Williamson (2004) .
introduced (see Table 7 for the American experience in terms of FWCAs).
Another consequence, one that generally further heightens acquisition cost pressures, is the ever diminishing size (in terms of the number of firms competing) of the defense capital weapons-building industry (Lorell and Levaux, 1998) . This only further heightens cost pressures as industry becomes more oligopolistic, indeed monopolistic, with the consequent price inflating pressures. The maintenance of existing force structures has come to pose significant difficulties for most of the Western nations. With declining overall allocations to the military, this has constrained choices in terms of how the ever more restricted budgets are used. Outside two of the larger powers, such as the US and the UK, most countries for which I have data (see Table 8 Cusack and Engelhardt, 2002) Table 9 . In three of the four equations the parameter on the military burden term is negative. However, one of these parameter estimates is not statistically significant; this is in the equation for social transfers. This finding of a lack of a tradeoff between defense and welfare spending is consistent with earlier research (see, e.g. Domke, et al 1983) . Interestingly, the military burden parameter estimate in the foreign aid equation takes on a positive (and statistically significant) value, suggesting that rather than being competitive budgetary items, military spending and foreign aid have been complements to one another, rising and declining jointly. This relationship is quite the opposite of what one would expect of the idealistic interpretation some analysts give to the motives of aid provision (cf., Lumsdaine, 1993) . Finally, there seems to have been a competitive relationship between military spending and both health and education outlays. This interpretation, of course, relies on the assumption that tradeoffs are a symmetric phenomena -a change in spending on one component implies a change in the opposite direction for the other component. In terms of the four major civilian spending categories that have been examined, this tradeoff relationship appears to occur only between the military budget on the one side, and health and education spending on the other. 
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Conclusion
Throughout the West, the drain that the military has placed on both government and societal resources generally has diminished since the heydays of the Cold War. This decline was hastened with the culmination of that conflict and the receding international threat. Given the economic pressures that many states confronted from both international and domestic sources, the West can be said to have experienced a fortuitous conjunction of lessening security demands with stable if not rising pressures to allocate more resources to social areas. At least in the areas of health and education, it would seem that governments have been able to move some resources away from the military function to these social purposes.
But in most countries there is little left in both financial terms and with respect to the military capability that financial resources can buy. A good part of the present reduced stocks of military capital in these countries is growing old (therefore potentially obsolete) and wearing out. Should other countries adopt and pay for the materials associated with the so-called "Revolution in Military
Affairs," these Western nations may be confronting external threats that they can no longer meet. Even in the absence of high-tech external threats, the demographic surges outside the West are likely to pose many international security challenges.
The excessive rise in relative prices associated with major military capital items, a rise only partially associated with an increase in real effectiveness, poses a test for many of these states if they are to retain their capacity to provide in some meaningful way for their own military defense. The money available for military purposes is declining or, at best, stagnating. The price per unit of military capital is rising exponentially. For many of the OECD countries, the laws of mathematics assure that something similar to the farcical outcome described by
Augustine will come to the fore sooner rather than later.
At the same time, the aging problem in the OECD countries will make it more difficult to attract sufficient personnel to the military (Goure, 2000) . With shrinking younger age cohorts, the size of the recruitment pool will grow smaller and the costs of attracting people into the military will increase. All of this takes place against a backdrop of popular anti-military sentiment that only makes recruitment more difficult.
Soldiers alone do not make an army. Without modern equipment, the military of many of these countries might better be employed for some internal or international policing purposes or other socially useful activities. The provision of security from external threats would then best be outsourced and resources found to pay for it. Obviously, one of the more preferable means to do this is
